by Known as the “father of drones” in Ukraine, Oleksandr Chendekov tells NV about the combination of Russian resources and Chinese manufacturing to provide the Russian army with modern UAVs, and how Ukraine could fight them.
As it happens, our interview with Chendekov, recorded in a cafe in Kyiv, was accompanied by the Russo-Iranian attack. Blew drones.
Chendekov co-founded the AI startup FoxFour.ai, after working for the Ukrspecsystems and Ukraine drone manufacturers, and was involved in the creation of the most famous Ukrainian UAV, the Bober (Beaver). These drones have repeatedly struck deep into Russian territory in the past, hitting buildings in the center of Moscow.
NV: What is the story of FPV (first person perspective) drone production? How common is it for small companies to produce them? What are the pros and cons of FPV drone production in Ukraine?
Chendekov: I see it as a help, because production by small companies has become the answer to the lethargic bureaucratic machine and centralized procurement of the Ministry of Defense.
NV: So this kind of decentralization is a good thing?
Chendekov: Yes, I tend to believe that decentralization is a good thing. It also means diversifying and reducing security risks. It is impossible to hit a huge factory and stop everything at the same time.
There are also disadvantages. It is more expensive and harder to control quality. But all this is decided at the customer level. It’s many a [funding] programs, including Victory of Drones [a volunteer project dedicated to UAVs]. So, I think now that one of the big challenges facing this industry is to increase production for this [one] million [of UAVs produced as an annual goal] that everyone is talking about, but the fact that they will start to lose a lot of efficiency in six months. It will be a challenge. Because now all these FPV drones are 100% made of Chinese components.
NV: You said earlier that FPV drones are not a substitute for traditional weapons.
Chendekov: Of course. Artillery will not disappear from the battlefield, for example. We really want to see the MLRS [multiple launch rocket systems] start turning into something more like HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) and [HIMARS-like] MLRS, so that our missile armaments are more accurate and effective. That is, increasing our capabilities not by firing more munitions, but by boosting their accuracy.
NV: To what extent can Ukraine supply itself with FPV drones?
Chendekov: Interesting question. If we mean assembly from Chinese components, it is completely possible. Give money to China and they will manufacture as much as we want, no problem. Another thing is that Russia will buy more, and here is something that really concerns me: any weapon, even if it has elements of innovation, some new approach, if it is based on Chinese components, Russia copies that very fast on it. He buys [components] in the same place, and he has more money.
NV: Prices for FPV drones are different, around $500-700. How profitable they are together?
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Chendekov: Without profit, any industry becomes without investment, without any resources going into production, without any improvements, and loss of personnel. The state, represented by the Cabinet, has promised arms manufacturers a 25% profit margin from the original price [to include in the price a profit of up to 25% from the basic cost price of products, including materials, components, labor costs, without administrative costs]. Another issue is when purchases are made with voluntary funds, I wouldn’t put it here. 25% gross profit from the original price, ie, it does not mean that there is a 25% net profit margin. I think the real margin is about 15%. It depends on production efficiency. Maybe one can afford 20%. It is important to understand that when we buy Ukrainian-made weapons, this profit is capitalized in the form of the development of our military industry.
NV: Could you, as an engineer, consider the examples of drones used by Russia?
Chendekov: I would illustrate the Russian Lancet drones. They have an autonomous guidance system. Roughly, he sees the target, captures it, and then pilots himself towards it. If we develop a drone like that, it will greatly improve our efficiency – if it works well. Because problems arise [with FPV drones] as you approach a goal. This could be a squad-level electronic warfare system, or certain obstacles to the radio signal: terrain, trees and buildings. Therefore, the presence of the autonomous guidance function is very important, and many groups are currently working on it, ours and theirs, of course.
NV: But the Russians have been using those Lancet UAVs less, lately.
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Chendekov: The West needs microchips to assemble such drones. Russia has no domestic chips capable of doing this. US, Chinese and Taiwanese chips are capable of this, as well as Korean chips. So the question is: if China [through which Russia has access to Western components] In addition to the sanctions, we could say that there would be a certain guarantee against Moscow developing this new capability.
As for anti-drone technology, I don’t think it will develop immediately. They will not work properly at first, and respective countermeasures will be developed later. Everyone has seen how drones are shot with small hands. Therefore, we will see systems that can do this automatically. They already exist but are expensive and were made to protect against anti-tank missiles.
NV: Do you think the development of electronic warfare (EW) in the next six months will make drones less effective?
Chendekov: This is my prediction, yes.
NV: What will this EW arms race look like?
Chendekov: I think that electronic warfare systems will be installed on armored vehicles, in dugouts, at firing sites. The infantry will not have such systems as it is too expensive to equip the entire force with it. But we are moving gradually, step by step, towards some of the great robot war movies, where people sit in dugouts or tanks and military robots remotely control them. If we talk about technological development, the level of autonomy of the robots will increase, and there will no longer be a need for full human control from start to finish.
NV: What about drone knives?
Chendekov: Swarm technology has different levels. The first is when many drones are used at the same time, in a coordinated way, each with individual control. This is level zero, and communication problems are already emerging at this level since radio frequencies are not enough to directly control so many UAVs in one place.
The second level is when the drones are connected to each other and controlled as a single entity. But the task of preparing or sending them simultaneously is still a challenge. The flight time of one drone can be five or 10 minutes. That is, they must all be sent as a float within at least one minute. That is, this part must be developed, ie the land address. they [drones in a swarm] connected to each other. If they lose this connection, they become helpless and can become vulnerable to electronic warfare. The Swarm concept is very beautiful and sounds promising, but it is a very difficult engineering task.
NV: What is the situation regarding the development of EW systems in Ukraine?
Chendekov: We have already created a powerful electronic warfare system against Shahed UAVs. Now, when these drones are flying, they cannot strike accurately because they are under pressure in advance, as they approach their targets. They have no satellite [GPS navigation] and have inaccurate inertial navigation systems.
NV: How efficient and how expensive is it to produce Shahed UAVs? Can Russia manufacture them in large numbers?
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Chendekov: It is important not to underestimate Russia’s resources because it is only money [than us]. Money can do a lot of different things, especially when it’s in the hands of a dictator with absolute power. They have no questions about arranging with suppliers, or about competition, or about pricing. Russian manufacturers do as they are told. There were reports about the Shahed production facility in Tatarstan: according to the available factory space, about 300 drones can be produced per month. I think the bottleneck is going to be the production of the engines, first of all, because it’s probably China that produces the engines for them. And the second is electronics. An anti-interference GPS antenna is one of the key features in Shahed’s UAVs, where US-made microcircuits are used. They have to buy them somewhere. I don’t know who to supply them to or if they have problems with them. I think this could be a limiting factor.
NV: What about the cost of these drones?
Chendekov: I estimate that Shahed’s UAV costs about $80,000, breaking even. Since they are exported from Iran, it will have a profit margin and all kinds of duties, taxes, etc. My estimate is around $150,000 [the cost of one Iranian Shahed UAV for Russians].
NV: Does Ukraine have an advantage over Russia in terms of drones?
Chendekov: Our advantage is that we are not isolated from the world and we can attract the best technologies and components in the West. That is, no one prevents us from taking some high-speed microchip and using it. We can submit documents for export control and receive them. We have no sanctions.
The motivation factor is also a plus. Everyone who deals with drones in Ukraine is getting emotional: they feel that they are doing something important. They don’t allow themselves to do anything wrong because they understand that people’s lives depend on it. Does Russia have this factor? I don’t know because I’m not an expert on this issue.
NV: How many companies do we have that produce large drones?
Chendekov: According to my estimation, about 10 companies produce large drones. Perhaps another dozen or so are voluntary foundations or simple voluntary groups that are not registered in any way and are also developing something. They have the opportunity to develop something, run tests and receive orders.
NV: What drones do we need more now?
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Chendekov: I want to focus on needs that are not currently being met. For example, everyone dreams of hitting strategic Russian airfields. While the enemy has Tu-95 strategic bombers launching Kh-101 and Kh-55 missiles, we can expect massive missile attacks. The limiting factor for missile attacks is the number of carriers, ie, the Tu-95 aircraft. Therefore, we need a drone that can cover more than 2,000 km [and hit the bombers].
A range of 2,000 km is difficult to achieve. Worldwide, only a few types of cruise missiles can achieve this, and only a handful of countries have succeeded in developing such weapons.
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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine
